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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Sailing in Safe Harbors: Recent
Developments Regarding Lender
Liability Under CERCLA
RON BURKE
I. Introduction
Secured creditors seeking to provide financing to busi-
nesses, especially those that handle hazardous waste, have
been operating in uncertain waters since the late 1980s.
Through a series of judicial decisions, uncertainty developed
over the scope of the safe harbor provision that exempts,
under certain conditions, a secured creditor from liability as
an "owner or operator" under the federal Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA). The most significant case was United States v.
Fleet Factors Corporation,2 where the Eleventh Circuit
opined, in dicta, that a secured creditor who participated in
the financial management of the borrower could be held liable
as an "operator" if that creditor had the capacity to control its
borrower's operations, regardless of whether the secured
creditor exercised that capacity to control. 3 Fleet Factors' ca-
pacity to control test created great uncertainty within the
lending community because it suggested that lenders could
be held liable, without actively participating in the manage-
ment of the facility, for cleanup costs which might far exceed
the value of the collateral obtained as security.
1. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994).
2. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
3. See id. at 1157-58.
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The United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), responding to the clamor created in large part by Fleet
Factors, promulgated a regulation in 1992 which sought to
clarify the scope of the exemption. 4 The rule, however, was
quickly invalidated by the D.C. Circuit in Kelley v. EPA,5
which held that EPA did not have the statutory authority to
define a class of liable parties under CERCLA. 6 Congress re-
acted in 1996 by amending CERCLA to include many of the
provisions contained in the 1992 EPA rule. 7
This Comment describes the recent history of the treat-
ment of the security interest exemption, and concludes with
an analysis of how the 1996 CERCLA Amendments will affect
the lending community. Part II of this Comment describes
CERCLA's liability regime, the 1992 EPA rule, case law
before and after the invalidation of the 1992 EPA rule, and
the Kelley decision. The 1996 CERCLA Amendments clarify-
ing the scope of the exemption are discussed in Part III. Case
law decided after the 1996 CERCLA Amendments and an
EPA enforcement policy statement issued in 1997 are
presented in Part IV. Finally, Part V presents an analysis of
the 1996 CERCLA Amendments, and Part VI is a conclusion,
stating that the 1996 amendments provide important protec-
tion for secured creditors, yet statutory and non-statutory in-
centives remain for such parties to be wary of contaminated
properties.
II. Background
A. CERCLA Liability
The 9 6 th Congress enacted CERCLA in December 1980.8
CERCLA applies "primarily to the cleanup of leaking inactive
4. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan; Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) [hereinafter
EPA Lender Rule].
5. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom Am. Bankers Ass'n
v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995).
6. See id.
7. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
8. See CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
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or abandoned sites and to emergency responses to spills."9 A
central goal of CERCLA is to make those parties who caused
environmental contamination pay for its cleanup, and courts
have broadly interpreted CERCLA to achieve this goal. 10
The enactment of CERCLA represented an "eleventh hour
compromise" between the two houses of Congress." The final
bill was passed in "considerable haste." 12 As a result, CER-
CLA is "not a paradigm of clarity or precision" as manifested,
inter alia, in poorly defined terms,' 3 and by "inconsistencies
and redundancies." 14
Unlike the "cooperative federalism" of the Clean Air
Act' 5 and the Clean Water Act, 16 CERCLA provides the fed-
eral government with primary authority to implement a
cleanup program. 17 Possible explanations for this non-defer-
ential legislative approach include: i) unlike traditional pol-
lution control (e.g., end-of-pipe) requirements, little ongoing
oversight is required once a cleanup action has been com-
pleted, and ii) Congress believed, at the time CERCLA was
enacted, that the federal government was best equipped to
develop and transfer expertise from one site to another, and
to address the complex issues posed by what was anticipated
to be a relatively low number of sites.' 8 Although EPA has
traditionally initiated CERCLA actions, at least forty-five
states have developed their own programs that parallel the
federal CERCLA regime. 19 In several areas, state programs
9. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985)
(quoting F. ANDERSON, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAw AND POLICY
568 (1984)).
10. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992).
11. See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1040.
12. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 368 (1986).
13. Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir.
1988).
14. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir.
1992).
15. CAA §§ 101-602(g), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(g) (1997).
16. FWPCA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1997).
17. See Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfields, 21
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 265, 266-67 (1997).
18. See id. at 267.
19. See id. at 267-268. For example, New York's counterpart to the federal
CERCLA statute is found in Title 13 of N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 27 (McKin-
19981 145
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are more proactive than CERCLA (e.g., no petroleum exclu-
sion provision; former owner or operators are subject to liabil-
ity regardless of whether the hazardous substance release
occurred during their involvement with the site).20
Under CERCLA section 104, the President is authorized
to undertake short-term "removal" actions to control immedi-
ate threats posed by releases or threatened releases of haz-
ardous substances, and to conduct longer-term "remedial
actions," consistent with the National Contingency Plan
(NCP), to cleanup contaminated sites.21 Congress directed
the President to revise the NCP, which was originally
promulgated for cleanups under section 311 of the Clean
Water Act,22 to "establish procedures and standards for re-
sponding to releases of hazardous substances" under
CERCLA.23
EPA's removal and remedial actions are financed in part
from the Hazardous Substance Trust Fund, commonly called
the Superfund, which is funded in part from an excise tax on
petroleum and certain other chemicals. 24 Superfund money
may be spent to finance "government response[s]" and to pay
any "claim[s] for necessary response costs incurred by any
other person" under the NCP.25
ney 1997); New Jersey's analog is the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Con-
trol Act found at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58 (West 1997).
20. See Abrams, supra note 17, at 268. CERCLA establishes minimum re-
quirements, and does not preempt state requirements that are more stringent.
See United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1454 (6th
Cir. 1991). States are precluded, however, from obtaining alternative remedies
that conflict with the terms of a consent decree that has been entered by a fed-
eral court. See id. at 1454-55.
21. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1997).
22. See FWPCA § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994).
23. CERCLA § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). The President subsequently
delegated these responsibilities to EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed.
Reg. 42,237 (1981).
24. See CERCLA § 107, 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1997). See also, 26 U.S.C. § 4611
(1997).
25. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a). Limitations exist, however, to the
government's use of the Superfund. For example, removal actions are generally
limited to less than $2 million and twelve months unless site-specific conditions
warrant otherwise. See CERCLA § 104(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1). Superfund
monies may only be used for remedial actions if certain conditions are met. See
CERCLA § 104(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3). For example, the site must ulti-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/16
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CERCLA also authorizes the government to recover re-
sponse costs from "responsible parties,"26 which allows the
government to "respond immediately while later trying to
shift financial responsibility to others."27 The charged party
incurs liability under CERCLA section 107 if four conditions
are met: i) the property is a "vessel or a facility,"28 ii) there
has been a "release" or "threatened release"29 of any "hazard-
ous substance,"30 iii) "response"31 costs have been incurred
mately be placed on the National Priorities List (NPL), and the state wherein
the site is located must contribute at least ten percent of the cleanup cost. See
CERCLA § 104(c)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(5)(A).
26. CERCLA §107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
27. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1041.
28. "Facility" includes:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipe-
line (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage
container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, dis-
posed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not
include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). As such, "facility" refers to both real
property and personal property that has been contaminated by hazardous sub-
stances. See CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
29. A "release" is defined broadly to include any "spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dump-
ing, or disposing into the environment." See CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(22).
30. "Hazardous substances" is defined broadly to include:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to § 311(b)(2)(A) of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, (B) any element, compound, mix-
ture, solution or substance designated pursuant to § 102 of this Act,
(C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified
under or listed pursuant to § 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act
(but not including waste the regulation of which has been sus-
pended by Act of Congress, (D) any toxic pollutant listed under
§ 307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, (E) any haz-
ardous air pollutant listed under § 112 of the Clean Air Act, and (F)
any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with re-
spect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to § 7
of the Toxic Substances Control Act.
CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
"The term hazardous substances [sic] excludes petroleum and natural gas, yet
this exclusion does not apply to petroleum that has been mixed with hazardous
substances otherwise regulated." Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, General
Counsel, to J. Winston Porter, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response (July 31, 1987).
5
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as a result of the release or threatened release; and iv) the
party charged falls within one of four classes of responsible
parties under section 107(a).32
Responsible parties liable for response costs under sec-
tion 107(a) consist of: 1) the "owner and operator" of a facil-
ity;33 2) any person 34 who "owned or operated" the facility
during the time when hazardous substances were disposed
of;35 3) any person who arranged for the disposal or treat-
ment, or transportation for such disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by that person (ar-
rangers);36 and 4) Any person who transports hazardous sub-
stances to a disposal or treatment facility selected by that
person (transporters).37
Liable parties under section 107 are responsible for all
costs incurred by government authorities for response actions
that are "not inconsistent" with the NCP, other necessary re-
sponse costs incurred by any other person that are consistent
with the NCP, natural resource damages, and health assess-
ment costs conducted under section 104(i).38 A liable party is
also subject to an administrative order under section 106 to
address an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to
public health and the environment.39
Liability under CERCLA "shall be construed to be the
standard of liability" under section 311 of the federal Clean
Water Act.40 Courts have interpreted CERCLA section
31. The term "response" includes removal and remedial actions. See CER-
CLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
32. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
33. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
34. A "person" is an "individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership,
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States government, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." See CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
35. See CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
36. See CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
37. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
38. SeeCERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
39. See CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
40. CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/16
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107(a) as imposing strict liability on responsible parties.41
CERCLA liability is also joint and several when the harm is
indivisible, 42 and is retroactive.4 3
Only three limited defenses exist for potentially liable
parties under CERCLA. 66 No liability exists if the party can
demonstrate that the release or threatened release of hazard-
ous substances resulted from: i) an act of God, ii) an act of
war, or iii) an act of a third party with whom the defendant
had no direct or indirect "contractual relationship"45 when
the defendant exercised due care with respect to the site and
took steps to prevent foreseeable consequences (commonly re-
ferred to as the innocent landowner defense).46
"Owner or operator" is defined, inter alia, as "any person
owning or operating" a facility.47 CERCLA's legislative his-
41. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); See also J.V. Peters & Co. Inc. v. EPA, 767
F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1985).
42. See Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 171.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1513-14 (11th Cir.
1997) (holding that CERCLA's response cost liability scheme applies to releases
of hazardous substances occurring before CERCLA's enactment).
44. See CERCLA § 107(b)(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(3).
45. The term "contractual relationship" includes land contracts, deeds or
other instruments transferring title or possession unless the real property was
acquired by the defendant after the deposition of hazardous substances and the
defendant, inter alia, at the time of acquisition, did not know or had "no reason
to know" at the time of acquisition that the property was contaminated with
hazardous substances. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
A defendant had "no reason to know" of the presence of hazardous sub-
stances if he/she undertook "all appropriate inquiry" into the previous owner-
ship and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary
practice in an effort to minimize liability. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)(B). CERCLA does not define "all appropriate inquiry" or "good com-
mercial or customary practice." CERCLA § 101 (35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(35)(B). The American Society for Testing Materials has issued two standards
for site assessments to provide guidance as to what constitutes this level of in-
spection: Transaction Screening Process (E 1528-93) and the Phase I Environ-
mental Site Assessment Process (E 1527-93).
46. See CERCLA § 107(b)(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(3). The innocent
landowner defense is rarely available to a party who conducts "all appropriate
inquiry" because the presence of significant contamination is unlikely to go un-
discovered during such an investigation. See Robert S. Berger et al., Recycling
Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting the Challenge of Brownfield Redevelop-
ment, 3 BUFF. ENvTL. L.J. 69, 84-86 (1995).
47. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
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tory does not provide much clarification by stating "in the
case of a facility, an 'operator' is defined to be a person who is
carrying out operational functions for the owner of the facility
pursuant to an appropriate agreement."48 An example of the
quick legislative drafting of CERCLA is the conjunctive in the
"owner and operator" language of section 107(a)(1), and the
disjunctive in "owner or operator" which is contained in sec-
tions 101(20)(A) and 107(a)(2). 49 Notwithstanding this dis-
crepancy, courts have not required a party to be both the
owner and operator to incur liability under section 107(a).50
Excluded from the definition of "owner or operator" is a
"person who, without participating in the management of a
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his se-
curity interest in the vessel or facility."51 This exemption is
the subject of this Comment and is referred to as the Security
Interest Exemption (SIE).52 Parties who seek to rely on the
SIE have the burden of proving that they qualify for that
exemption. 53
Three phrases in the SIE that have led to uncertainty
are: i) "indicia of ownership," ii) "primarily to protect a secur-
ity interest," and iii) "participating in the management."54
For example, a lender will typically take certain actions prior
to providing a loan, during the period when the loan is per-
forming, during pre-foreclosure or workout actions, and/or
during post-foreclosure. 55 Such actions might include moni-
toring facility performance, conducting environmental inves-
48. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994,
20,996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (referencing H.R. REP. NO. 172, 96' Cong., 2d
Sess. 1980, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N., 6160, 6180).
49. See Redwing Carriers Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1497-
98 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
50. See id.
51. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
52. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) contains a similar
security interest exemption for an "owner" of a petroleum underground storage
tank (UST) who is not otherwise engaged in petroleum production, refining, and
marketing. See SWDA § 9003(h)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(9).
53. See United States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 366
(1967).
54. See EPA Lender Rule, supra note 4, at 18,374.
55. See id. at 18,376-77.
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tigations, requiring compliance or cleanup activities,
refinancing or undertaking loan workouts, or providing finan-
cial advice. 56 Uncertainty regarding the SIE, especially prior
to the CERCLA Amendments in 1996, includes the extent to
which these activities constitute participation in the manage-
ment of the debtor.5 7
Moreover, uncertainty regarding the scope of the SIE
provides a disincentive for lenders to become involved in the
redevelopment of brownfields. Brownfields are "abandoned,
idled or underused industrial and commercial facilities where
expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or per-
ceived environmental contamination."58 The number of
brownfield sites in the United States ranges from tens of
thousands to 450,000 sites.59 Redevelopment of brownfields
is hindered by: i) potential liability under CERCLA or other
environmental laws, ii) technical difficulties related to defin-
ing the full extent of contamination and the necessary extent
of remediation, iii) uncertainty regarding total cleanup costs,
iv) community concerns regarding health risks from the pres-
ence of contamination and cleanup remedy selected, and v)
non-environmental barriers (e.g., obsolete infrastructure,
limited access, crime, congestion).60
EPA's Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative is
intended to facilitate the redevelopment of brownfields. 6 1
The four "cornerstones" of EPA's initiative consist of
brownfields demonstration pilot projects, clarification of lia-
bility issues (e.g., lender liability), partnerships with other
stakeholders to coordinate redevelopment efforts, and
56. See id. at 18,345.
57. See id. at 18,376.
58. U.S. EPA, Brownfields Glossary of Terms (last modified September 30,
1997) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/glossary.htm#brow>.
59. See State of the States on Brownfields: Programs for Cleanup and Reuse
of Contaminated Sites, Office of Technology Assessment, June 1995, 4 (OTA-
BP-ETI-153).
60. See id. at 5-10.
61. See U.S. EPA, Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative (last
modified March 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/
econinit.htm>.
1998]
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"workforce development" efforts in brownfields communi-
ties.62
Forty-six states have some form of initiative underway
for brownfields redevelopment. 63 The state-by-state mix of
initiatives varies and includes funding of brownfields
projects, providing incentives (e.g., tax) to attract private in-
vestment, and offering comfort letters (e.g., no further action
letters, covenants not to sue) for cleanup actions.6 4
B. Case Law Prior to 1992 EPA Rule
In United States v. Mirabile,65 the district court denied
Mellon Bank's (Mellon) motion for summary judgment 66 be-
cause a genuine issue of material fact existed67 as to whether
Mellon, as a secured creditor, had participated in the bor-
rower's day-to-day nonfinancial management decisions to an
extent that violated the SIE.68 Mellon had provided working
capital financing, secured by current assets, to Turco Coat-
ings, Inc. (Turco).69 Mellon's summary judgment motion,
claiming protection under the SIE, was denied because of the
current property owners' allegations that, prior to Turco ceas-
ing operations, Mellon representatives visited the site fre-
62. See id. EPA submitted a brownfields budget request of $91 million for
fiscal year 1999, relative. to the fiscal 1998 budget of $87 million. Air Quality,
Hazardous Waste Cleanup Highlighted in Fiscal 1999 Funding Request, 28
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2015 (Feb. 6, 1998).
63. See State-by-State Brownfields Report Prepared by Northeast-Midwest
Institute (Jan. 28, 1998), 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2086 (Feb. 6, 1998).
64. See id.
65. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
66. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) authorizes the court to render
summary judgment "forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
67. "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat the otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
68. See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
69. See id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/16
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quently and insisted on certain manufacturing changes and
reassignment of personnel. 70
EPA sought to recover its response costs from the site own-
ers, Anna and Thomas Mirabile.7 1 The Mirabiles joined two
of three lenders (i.e., Mellon, and American Bank and Trust
Company (ABT)), who had previously provided financing to
Turco, as third-party defendants on grounds that the lenders
were liable as former owner and operators.
72
The district court in Mirabile held that, in order to lose
the protection of the SIE, a secured creditor "must, at a mini-
mum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects" of
the facility.7 3 On this basis, the court found that ABT acted
within the scope of the SIE. 74 ABT's actions included suc-
cessfully bidding at the sheriffs sale, taking measures to se-
cure the site against vandalism after all operations had
ceased, and then assigning its bid to a third party. 75 The
court held these activities by ABT were permissible as they
were "prudent and routine steps" undertaken merely to pro-
tect its security interest after all operations had ceased.
7 6
A narrower interpretation of the SIE was made by the
district court for Maryland in United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co.,77 where the SIE was voided by a mortga-
gee who foreclosed on a property and held title to that prop-
erty for four years. 78 The secured creditor, Maryland Bank &
Trust Co. (MB&T), took title at a foreclosure sale in 1982 to a
property which had been used by MB&T's borrower as a haz-
70. See id.
71. See id. at 20,994.
72. See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,995. Mellon and
ABT then counterclaimed against the United States alleging that if their activi-
ties resulted in CERCLA liability, then the Small Business Administration
(SBA), the third lender, should be liable as well. See id. The SBA loan agree-
ment with Turco included certain restrictions on Turco's finances but the court
found that this involvement in the financial aspects of Turco's operations was
insufficient to void the SIE for the SBA. See id. at 20,997.
73. Id. at 20,996.
74. See id. at 20,997.
75. See id. at 20,996.
76. See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
77. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
78. See id.
1998] 153
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ardous waste dump.7 9 EPA subsequently removed contami-
nated soils and drums from the site, and sought to recover its
response action costs from MB&T.80 At the time of the
court's decision, MB&T still held title to the property,8 ' but
disclaimed liability on the basis of the SIE.82 The court, how-
ever, found that MB&T was liable as an owner because the
SIE includes only "those persons who, at the time of the
cleanup, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held se-
curity interest in the land."8 3 The court decided that MB&T
lost the exemption when it foreclosed on the property because
it purchased the property "not to protect its security interest,
but to protect its investment."8 4 The court reasoned that
MB&T's position would violate a fundamental tenet of CER-
CLA which is that responsible parties, and not the govern-
ment, should bear the costs of cleanup.8 5 If MB&T were to
avoid liability, then MB&T would benefit from the increased
value of the property because of the cleanup done at the gov-
ernment's expense.8 6 The court did not address whether a
lender who promptly sells a parcel of land after foreclosure,
unlike MB&T, remains within the SIE.8 7
In Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing
Company, Inc.,88 the western Pennsylvania district court fol-
lowed this narrow interpretation, holding that the National
Bank of Commonwealth (National Bank), which purchased
the subject property at a foreclosure sale, should be liable to
the "same extent as any other bidder would have been."8 9
National Bank had received a third-party complaint seeking
contribution for response costs as a former owner and opera-
tor during the eight-month period that National Bank held
79. See id. at 575.
80. See id. at 576.
81. See id. at 575.
82. See id. at 577.
83. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 579.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 580.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 579.
88. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
89. Id. at 563.
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title to the property.90 The court, in denying National Bank's
motion for summary judgment, held that the SIE did not ap-
ply to the time that National Bank owned title to the prop-
erty, and genuine issues of fact existed regarding whether
hazardous substances were released during National Bank's
ownership period. 91
A secured creditor's motion to dismiss on grounds of the
SIE was denied in United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,92 because a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether that se-
cured creditor participated in the management of the facil-
ity.93 EPA filed suit against Nicolet, Inc. (Nicolet) claiming
that Nicolet, as the current owner of a manufacturing site in
Pennsylvania, was liable for over $2.5 million in EPA re-
sponse costs related to the cleanup of an area where asbestos-
containing waste material had been dumped. 94 T & N Public
Limited Company (T&N) held a mortgage on the property,
and owned all of the stock of Keasbey & Mattison Company
(Keasbey) which operated the site prior to Nicolet.95 EPA
amended its complaint to add T&N as a defendant, alleging
that T&N was liable for its response costs under five theories
of liability, including that T&N was liable as a former owner
or operator because T&N held a mortgage on property and
actively participated in the facility's management. 96 The dis-
90. See id. at 557.
91. See id. at 563-64.
92. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
93. See id. at 1204.
94. See id. at 1195-96.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 1196-97. The government's other theories included that T&N:
i) was the alter ego of Keasbey because T&N had "both a substantial ownership
interest and exercised substantial involvement in Keasbey," and, as such, the
corporate veil between T&N and Keasbey should be pierced; ii) was the alter
ego of Keasbey in that T&N dominated Keasbey's policies operations and man-
agement, and that the corporate form of Keasbey served to "defeat public con-
venience, protect fraud, or defend crime;" iii) actively participated as sole
shareholder in Keasbey's management during the time that asbestos disposal
occurred on site and thus was liable section 107(a)(2); iv) was liable as a former
owner and operator because it was "familiar [as the parent corporation] with
Keasbey's waste disposal practices and had the capacity to abate environmental
harm caused by such activities." Id.
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trict court, following the holdings in Maryland Bank,97
Mirabile,98 and Fleet Factors,99 agreedwith the government's
position that a mortgagee incurs CERCLA liability "only if
the mortgagee participated in the managerial and opera-
tional aspects of the facility." 100 As such, the court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss the government's complaint be-
cause the government had alleged facts sufficient to raise a
question as to T&N's liability.110
The case creating the greatest clamor was United States
v. Fleet Factors Corporation,0 2 in which the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of Fleet Factors Corpora-
tion's (Fleet) summary judgment motion when Fleet asserted
the SIE. 10 3 In 1976, Fleet had entered into a "factoring" ar-
rangement with Swainsboro Print Works, Inc. (SPW) where
Fleet advanced funds, secured by SPW's accounts receivable,
and Fleet obtained a security interest in the remaining plant,
property and equipment. 0 4 In 1979, SPW filed for Chapter
11 protection and, with court approval, the factoring arrange-
ment with Fleet continued. 0 5 In late 1981, after Fleet
stopped advancing funds because of SPW's deteriorating fi-
nancial condition, SPWs bankruptcy proceeding was con-
verted to Chapter 7 liquidation and a trustee was assigned to
the facility. 10 6
In May 1982, after obtaining bankruptcy court approval,
Fleet foreclosed on its security interest in certain of SPW's
inventory and equipment, and contracted with Baldwin In-
dustrial Liquidators, Inc. (Baldwin) to auction these materi-
97. See Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 573.
98. See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,994.
99. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.
1990), affg 724 F. Supp 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
100. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp at 1205.
101. See id.
102. See Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F. 2d at 1550.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1550.
105. See id.
106. See id.
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als. 10 7 Fleet never foreclosed on the real property. 10 8 In
August 1982, Fleet entered into an agreement with Nix Rig-
gers (Nix) where Nix had up to 180 days to remove the inven-
tory and equipment left unsold from Baldwin's auction. 0 9
The government alleged that i) Baldwin moved several hun-
dred leaking drums of chemicals away from the planned auc-
tion area to a different on-site area, and ii) asbestos pipe
insulation on the equipment was disturbed by Nix and/or the
parties who purchased the equipment at the auction." 0 In
January 1984, EPA removed 700 fifty-five gallon drums and
forty-four truckloads of asbestos-containing materials."'
Three years later, Emanuel County acquired the site at a
foreclosure sale due to SPW's failure to pay taxes. 1 2
The United States then sued the former principal officers
of SPW and Fleet to recover its cleanup costs." 3 Fleet was
granted interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit after its
motion for summary judgment was denied by the district
court. 114
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial
of Fleet's summary judgment motion because of Fleet's ac-
tions after SPW had ceased operations. 115 The court rea-
soned that Fleet's actions which voided the SIE included: i)
requiring SPW to obtain Fleet's approval prior to shipping its
products to customers, ii) setting the price for excess inven-
tory, iii) deciding when employees should be fired, iv) con-
tracting with Baldwin and Nix to remove the equipment and
inventory, and v) prohibiting SPW from selling certain chemi-
cal drums which remained at the site until they were ulti-
107. See Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1552. Some of the materials were
sold at an auction with the buyers removing the items on an "as is" and "in
place" basis. See id. at 1552.
108. See id. at 1555.
109. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp 955, 958 (S.D. Ga.
1988).
110. See id.
111. See Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1553.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1560.
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mately removed by EPA. 116 The Eleventh Circuit held that
these actions, if proven true, would remove Fleet from the
scope of the SIE because they constituted participation in the
financial and operational management of SPW.117
The Eleventh Circuit then defined, in dicta, a narrow
scope of the SIE which created great uncertainty in the lend-
ing community: a secured creditor may face section 107(a)
owner or operator liability if it "participat[ed] in the financial
management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to
influence" the facility's hazardous waste management prac-
tices.1 8 Moreover, a secured creditor would be similarly lia-
ble if its "involvement with the management of the facility is
sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose.""19 As such,
the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Mirabile20 court's interpre-
tation of the SIE which required day-to-day participation in
the management or operation of the facility to void the
exemption. 121
The Eleventh Circuit foresaw some of the negative reac-
tion that would be created by its decision and sought to re-
buke such criticism. 22 The court dismissed concerns that
such a narrow interpretation would create disincentives for
creditors to provide loans to businesses that are perceived to
present increased hazardous waste liability. 23 The court be-
lieved that a narrow interpretation would create incentives
for i) lenders to conduct careful pre-loan due diligence investi-
gations regarding a potential debtor's hazardous waste man-
agement practices, ii) debtors to better manage their
116. See Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1559.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 1557.
119. Id. at 1558.
120. See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
121. See id.
122. See Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1558.
123. See id. A 1991 American Bankers Association survey reported that
sixty-two percent of banks had declined to provide a loan because of environ-
mental liability concerns. See Court Rejects Lender Shield, ENGINEERING NEws-
REC., Feb. 21, 1994, at 24.
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hazardous wastes, and iii) lenders to ensure that the debtor
follows proper waste management practices.124
Subsequent cases generally did not follow Fleet Factors'
narrow interpretation of the SIE. In Bergsoe Metal Corpora-
tion v. Eastern Asiatic Company,125 the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the granting of the Port of St. Helens' (Port) motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the Port was exempt
from CERCLA liability because it held title to property in or-
der to protect its security interest, and its unexercised rights
as a lessor of the property (i.e., right to inspect the property
and retake possession upon foreclosure) did not constitute
participation in the management of the facility. 126 The Port
issued industrial development revenue bonds for the con-
struction of a secondary lead recycling plant in St. Helens,
then sold the land to Bergsoe Metal Corporation (Bergsoe) for
construction of the recycling plant. 127 The Port subsequently
took back the deed under a sale-and-leaseback provision. 128
The Port then mortgaged the property, assigned the leases,
and sold the revenue bonds to the United States National
Bank of Oregon (Bank of Oregon).129 Four years after begin-
ning operations, Bergsoe filed for involuntary bankruptcy
under Chapter 11.130 The Bank of Oregon and the trustee
filed suit against the corporate owners of Bergsoe's stock,
East Asiatic Company Ltd. (EAC), to collect on Bergsoe's
debts and to seek a declaration that EAC was liable for con-
tamination discovered on the property by the Oregon Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality. 131 EAC filed a third-party
complaint against the Port and counterclaim against the
Bank of Oregon, alleging that they were liable under CER-
124. See Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1558.
125. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
126. See id. at 673.
127. See id. at 669.
128. See id. at 669-70.
129. See id. at 670.
130. See Bergsoe Metal Corporation, 910 F.2d at 670.
131. See id.
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CLA. 132 The Port filed a motion for summary judgment
claiming that it was exempt from liability under the SIE.133
The Ninth Circuit held that even though the Port held
title to the property, this ownership was for the purpose of
protecting the Port's security interest.13 4 The court reasoned
that the "lease" between Bergsoe and the Port was similar to
a security agreement in substance because the lease pay-
ments, which were equal to the bond's principal and interest
amounts and were to be paid directly to the Bank of Oregon,
terminated when the bonds were paid off. 135 Moreover, Berg-
soe retained typical indicia of ownership, such as responsibil-
ity for payment of taxes and insurance and risk of loss from
property damage. 136
In holding that the Port did not participate in the man-
agement of Bergsoe, the Ninth Circuit opined that "[wihat is
critical is not what rights the Port had, but what it did."137
The court, however, declined to specify what level of partici-
pation would void the SIE.138
C. The EPA Lender Rule
EPA promulgated a rule on April 29, 1992, (EPA Lender
Rule) to clarify the scope of the SIE.139 EPA considered this a
legislative or substantive rule, and stated in preamble lan-
guage that it was to apply not only in litigation involving the
government but also litigation between private parties. 140
Due to the questions raised by the Fleet Factors' dicta,141
EPA noted in the preamble that impermissible "management
participation does not include the unexercised right to be-
132. See id.
133. See id. at 670-71.
134. See id. at 673.
135. See id. at 671.
136. See Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d at 671. The court also noted that the
deeds were placed in escrow with the Bank of Oregon, and Bergsoe could
purchase the property for $100 when the bonds were paid off. See id.
137. Id. at 672.
138. See id.
139. See EPA Lender Rule, supra note 4.
140. See id. at 18,368.
141. See Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557.
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come involved in operational facility decisionmaking."142
EPA maintained, however, that the rule was otherwise con-
sistent with the Eleventh Circuit's holding.143
EPA set out a two-prong general test to determine
whether a security interest holder has impermissibly partici-
pated in the management of a facility. 44 Under the first
prong, management participation is indicated by the holder
having "exercised decisionmaking control over the borrower's
environmental compliance" activities. 45 Under the second-
prong, the test looks to the actual level of involvement by the
holder in the overall management of the day-to-day opera-
tions, regardless of whether control over the borrower's envi-
ronmental compliance activities has been assumed or not.' 46
The second prong was meant in part to guard against a
holder "carving out" environmental matters from its control
of the facility in an effort to protect itself from liability.14v
EPA described, in the preamble, which actions taken by
a person who holds "indicia of ownership" 148 would and would
not constitute participation in the management of the bor-
rower.' 49 For example, impermissible actions included "ac-
tual participation in the management or operational affairs of
the vessel or facility," and "decisionmaking control over the
borrower's environmental compliance" matters. 50 Participa-
tion in the management also included assuming responsibil-
ity for day-to-day decisionmaking regarding: a) the environ-
mental compliance matters of the borrower's facility, or b) all
142. EPA Lender Rule, supra note 4 at 18,379.
143. See id. at 18,369.
144. See id. at 18,359.
145. Id.
146. See EPA Lender Rule, supra note 4 at 18,359-60.
147. See id. at 18,360.
148. Id. at 18,374. EPA defined indicia of ownership as "evidence of interests
in real or personal property" and provided examples including a "mortgage,
deed of trust, or legal or equitable title obtained pursuant to foreclosure or its
equivalents, a surety bond, guarantee of an obligation, title held pursuant to a
lease financing transaction in which the lessor does not select initially the
leased property, or an assignment, lien, pledge, or other right to or form of en-
cumbrance against the property." Id.
149. See id. at 18,373-80.
150. Id. at 18,383.
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or nearly all of the non-environmental operational (but not
financial or administrative) matters of the facility. 151
Permissible actions related to environmental matters
that do not rise to participation in management included: i)
conducting environmental inspections of the subject prop-
erty,152 ii) requiring a prospective borrower to take certain
cleanup actions or other actions to achieve compliance with
applicable environmental laws, and iii) conducting response
actions under section 107(d)(1) of CERCLA or under the di-
rection of a NCP on-scene coordinator. 153
Regarding workout activities, actions under the EPA
Lender Rule that would not void the SIE, as long as those
actions do not involve participation in management, included:
i) restructuring the terms of the security interest, ii) requir-
ing additional rent or interest, iii) providing specific or gen-
eral financial advice, and iv) exercising rights under an
escrow agreement. 54 EPA defined "workout" as those "ac-
tions by which a holder, at any time prior to foreclosure or its
equivalents, seeks to prevent, cure or mitigate a default by
the borrower or obligor; or to preserve, or prevent the diminu-
tion of, the value of the security."155
Finally, EPA stated in the preamble to the EPA Lender
Rule that mere foreclosure did not, contrary to Maryland
Bank,' 56 convert an indicia of ownership into actual owner-
ship.' 57 Indicia of ownership held to protect a security inter-
est was defined in the EPA Lender Rule to include "legal or
equitable title acquired through or incident to foreclosure and
its equivalents." 58 In order to obtain such post-foreclosure
151. See EPA Lender Rule, supra note 4 at 18,383.
152. See id. at 18,376-77. EPA noted in the preamble that liability of a se-
curity interest holder under the SIE should not be affected by whether or not
the holder conducted an environmental inspection in connection with obtaining
the security interest, nor should the holder's liability be affected by the results
of any such inspection. See id.
153. See id. at 18,383.
154. See id. at 18,383.
155. Id.
156. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
157. See EPA Lender Rule, supra note 4, at 18,377.
158. Id. at 18,383-84.
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protection, the security holder must not have participated in
the management of the facility prior to foreclosure and must
undertake to divest itself of the property in a "reasonably ex-
peditious manner."159 No time limit was set by EPA as to
when a lender must divest its title, although the Rule did pro-
vide that a lender holding title is deemed to be doing so to
protect its security interest if the lender lists the facility for
sale within twelve months following foreclosure, 160 while a
holder who "outbids, rejects or fails to act upon an offer of fair
consideration" for the property is not considered to hold indi-
cia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest.161
The SIE only applies to potential owner or operator lia-
bility under CERCLA sections 107(a)(1) and (a)(2). The EPA
Lender Rule expressly stated that a lender acting within the
exemption would nonetheless be potentially liable as an "ar-
ranger" or "transporter" under CERCLA section 107(a)(3) and
(a)(4), respectively. 162
D. Case Law Subsequent to Promulgation of EPA Lender
Rule
In Waterville Industries, Inc. v. Finance Authority of
Maine (Waterville),163 the First Circuit held that one of the
goals of the SIE was to protect those lenders holding title to
property as security for debt, and that Congress intended for
this protection to include lease financing arrangements.16 4
The court opined that Congress' intention was to avoid dis-
rupting avenues of credit and to limit the wide breadth of
CERCLA liability to those owners who "had the real equity
interest in the property."165 The court noted that this finding
was consistent with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Bergsoe
159. Id. at 18,384.
160. See id. at 18,384.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 18,385.
163. 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993).
164. See id. at 552.
165. Id. at 552.
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Metal Corporation, 166 which stated that a lease financing ar-
rangement qualifies as a security interest under CERCLA. 167
In Waterville, a textile manufacturer defaulted on con-
struction loans for a textile mill; the Finance Authority of
Maine (FAME) was the guarantor of the loans and accepted a
deed in lieu of foreclosure. 168 FAME immediately leased the
property to the First Hartford Corporation (FHC) to allow the
mill to continue operations. 169 Hazardous wastes were re-
leased into two wastewater lagoons during the time that
FAME was the lessor. 170 When FHC subsequently filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, the bankruptcy court rec-
ognized FAME as the title holder of the property. 17' After
FHC's unsuccessful attempt to sell the property, FAME con-
veyed the site within eight months to the predecessor of Wa-
terville Industries. 172 Waterville Industries remediated the
wastewater lagoons, as directed by an EPA administrative
order, and then filed a contribution action 173 against FAME
alleging that FAME was liable as a former owner of the
property.174
The First Circuit held that FAME's nominal ownership
did not void the SIE because FAME successfully reconveyed
the property within a reasonable time period. 175 The court
held, consistent with the EPA Lender Rule, that the SIE ap-
plies to a "lender-lessor" as long as that party makes a rea-
sonably prompt effort to divest itself of the property once the
lease arrangement is terminated.176 Moreover, the court
found that Congress intended the SIE to protect from liability
166. See 910 F.2d at 668.
167. See Waterville Indus., Inc., 984 F.2d at 553; see generally, Bergsoe, 910
F.2d at 668.
168. See Waterville Indus., Inc., 984 F.2d at 550.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 551.
172. See id.
173. See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (allowing a person to
seek contribution, for response costs incurred, from any other person who is
potentially liable under § 9607(a)).
174. See Waterville Indus., Inc., 984 F.2d at 551.
175. See id. at 552.
176. See id. at 553.
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those "'owners' who are in essence lenders holding title to the
property as security for the debt."177
The First Circuit followed this reasoning in Northeast
Doran, Inc. v. Key Bank of Maine, 78 where it affirmed the
dismissal of a complaint against a mortgagee because the
mortgagee's divestiture of a property, less than six months
after acquiring a judgment of foreclosure, was reasonably
prompt and within the bounds of the SIE. 79 Key Bank of
Maine (Key), the mortgagee, sold the property at an auction
to Northeast Doran, Inc.'8 0 The court also held that Key's
interest in the property was to protect its security interest.' 8'
Key retained an independent consultant to conduct an envi-
ronmental assessment of the property which found possible
contamination; the court, consistent with the EPA Lender
Rule, held that this action did not remove Key from the pro-
tection of the SIE. 8 2
On Fleet Factors' remand from the Eleventh Circuit, 8 3
the federal District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
applied the EPA Lender Rule.'8 4 The court held that Fleet
Factors Corporation (Fleet) was liable as a former owner and
operator because its agents (i.e., Baldwin, Nix)' 85 voided the
SIE after Fleet's foreclosure on certain personal property. 8 6
However, prior to the time it foreclosed on the inventory, ma-
chinery and equipment, Fleet did not violate the EPA Lender
Rule's two-prong participation in management test because
177. Id. at 552.
178. 15 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994).
179. See id. at 3.
180. See id. at 2.
181. See id. at 3.
182. See id.
183. See generally, Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550.
184. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga.
1993) [hereinafter Fleet Factors Remand].
185. See supra notes 99-113 and accompanying text for a description of the
underlying facts regarding the Fleet Factors case. Fleet did not dispute that a
principal-agent relationship existed with respect to the actions of Baldwin and
Nix at the SPW site. See Fleet Factors Remand, supra note 184, at 714.
186. See Fleet Factors Remand, supra note 184, at 710.
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its actions were "consistent with those a reasonable, similarly
situated secured creditor probably would have taken."8 7
During the post-foreclosure period, Baldwin impermissi-
bly participated in the management by relocating on the
property "several hundred damaged, corroded and leaking
drums" so they would not interfere with the planned auc-
tion.' 88 The court noted that "mere incidental handling" of
hazardous substances by a lender after foreclosure would not
void the SIE.i8 9 The drums in this instance, however, posed
an "apparent and serious" environmental threat and Bald-
win's actions were more than incidental handling.190 Bald-
win's actions voided the SIE because they were not conducted
under the direction of an NCP on-scene coordinator or were
otherwise consistent with the NCP, as required by the EPA
Lender Rule. 191
For the same reasons that made Baldwin liable, Nix's ac-
tions in salvaging property unsold from Baldwin's auction vi-
olated the EPA Lender Rule because Nix improperly handled
hazardous substances in a manner that aggravated a serious
environmental threat, and Nix's actions represented imper-
missible day-to-day decisionmaking control over environmen-
tal matters at the facility. 192 In addition, Nix's eighteen-
month presence on the site was not "reasonably expeditious"
as required by the EPA Lender Rule for post-foreclosure
divestiture. 193
Finally, the court noted that Baldwin's and Nix's actions
resulted in hazardous substance releases (e.g., spills from the
drums).194 These releases, coupled with the forfeiture of the
187. Id. at 716.
188. Id. at 718.
189. Id. at 719.
190. See id.
191. See Fleet Factors Remand, supra note 184, at 710.
192. See id. at 718. The court noted that Nix's actions were conducted with
"all the finesse of a Viking raiding party." Id. at 720. Such actions included
"shov[ing] chemical drums about the site to [prepare for] salvage operations,
back[ing] into and crush[ing] the drums with tractors, scrap[ing] (and
chopp[ing] with hatchets) asbestos-laden insulation from equipment and ma-
chinery" and allowing that material to accumulate on the floor. Id.
193. See id. at 721.
194. See id. at 721.
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SIE, resulted in Fleet's liability under CERCLA section
107(a)(2) as a former owner or operator during the time of
disposal of hazardous substances.195
E. Kelley Decision Vacating EPA Lender Rule
In Kelley v. EPA,1 96 the State of Michigan and the Chem-
ical Manufacturers Association promptly challenged the EPA
Lender Rule in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The court
vacated the rule on grounds that Congress intended the judi-
cial system, rather than EPA, to determine the scope of liabil-
ity under section 107 of CERCLA. 197
EPA made several arguments that Congress had pro-
vided it with specific authority to issue substantive regula-
tions. First, EPA claimed that CERCLA section 105, which
authorized EPA to develop the NCP and to "reflect and effec-
tuate the responsibilities and powers created by this chap-
ter," included a delegation of power to decide the liability of
parties under section 107 because section 107 liability is one
such "responsibility and power."198 Although recognizing
that section 105 does "provide the EPA with broad rulemak-
ing authority to craft the NCP,"199 the court held that section
105 did not provide EPA with authority to define liability
under section 107 but only to "limit the level of damages re-
coverable by the prevailing party."200
EPA claimed that CERCLA section 115 provides the
agency with general authority to issue any rule that is rea-
sonably related to the statute's goal.201 The D.C. Circuit re-
195. See Fleet Factors Remand, supra note 184, at 723-24.
196. 15 F.3d at 1100. CERCLA provides the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
with exclusive jurisdiction to review agency regulations promulgated under
CERCLA. See CERCLA § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a).
197. See Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1107. The EPA Lender Rule was removed from
the Code of Federal Regulations on June 29, 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,912-13
(1995).
198. Kelly, 15 F.3d at 1105.
199. Id. (quoting Ohio v. EPA, 838 F.2d 1325, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
200. Id.
201. See id. CERCLA provides the President with authority to "delegate and
assign any duties or powers imposed upon or assigned to him and to promulgate
any regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." CER-
CLA § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 9615.
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jected this argument because the Agency did not demonstrate
either "explicit or implicit evidence of congressional intent to
delegate interpretive authority" for defining classes of
liability.20 2
EPA also argued that since section 107(a)(4)(A) allows it
to bring an enforcement action against a potentially responsi-
ble party to recover response costs incurred by EPA, then
EPA must first necessarily determine whether that party is
liable under section 107.203 The court rejected this argument
by reasoning that the final determination of a party's liability
is made by the courts, even though EPA, like any government
prosecutor, must initially exercise judgment in determining
whether to bring a civil action against a party who is poten-
tially liable.20 4
Similarly, the court noted that the ultimate determina-
tion of liability under section 106 is made by the courts after
a party's compliance with an administrative order issued by
EPA to respond to an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment.20 5 As such, CERCLA requires parties to "shoot first
(clean up) and ask questions (determine who bears the ulti-
mate liability) later."20 6
CERCLA section 106(b)(2) allows a party who has com-
plied with such an administrative order to petition EPA for
reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred if that party be-
lieves that it is not liable under section 107.207 If EPA denies
the request for reimbursement, then the party may bring an
action in federal district court and obtain reimbursement if it
can show by a "preponderance of the evidence" that it is not a
liable party under section 107.20 EPA argued that it must
202. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1106.
203. See id. at 1107.
204. See id. at 1105.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. See CERCLA § 106(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A).
208. See CERCLA § 106(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(C). A party who is
liable under section 107(a) may nonetheless obtain reimbursement if it can
demonstrate that the response action ordered by EPA was "arbitrary and capri-
cious or was otherwise not in accordance with law." CERCLA § 106(b)(2)(D), 42
U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(D).
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decide a party's liability under section 107 when determining
whether to reimburse that party under section 106(b)(2).20 9
The court disagreed and noted that if a party brings an action
against EPA for reimbursement, then EPA is a defendant
whose preliminary judgment as to the plaintiffs liability is
entitled to "no consideration, let alone the deference afforded
to the typical administrative adjudication."210 Moreover,
since private parties can bring actions under various provi-
sions of CERCLA211 without the government's involvement,
the court reasoned that this provided further evidence of con-
gressional intent to have courts, rather than EPA, determine
the scope of liability under section 107.212
EPA asserted in the preamble to the EPA Lender Rule
that, even if not a legislative rule, the Rule should receive
substantial deference as an interpretive rule.213 The court
disagreed and rejected the EPA Lender Rule as an interpre-
tive rule on the same grounds that disqualified it as a sub-
stantive rule. The court reasoned that since Congress did not
intend for EPA to decide the liability of parties, then EPA's
interpretation of the scope of liability deserves no Chevron
deference. 214 Additionally, the court reasoned that no defer-
ence was warranted because i) an independent cause of ac-
tion existed for private parties in federal court to decide the
liability issue which courts should adjudge without the cloud
of EPA's interpretive view, and ii) the agency's only statutory
209. See Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1106.
210. Id. at 1107.
211. For example, CERCLA provides that a responsible party, who has in-
curred CERCIA response costs, may seek contribution from other responsible
parties potentially liable under section 107(a), and the court will use "such equi-
table factors as the court determines appropriate" in allocating response costs.
CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Even if EPA were to reimburse the
party, the court noted that EPA's determination of liability would not be bind-
ing in federal court in a subsequent contribution action brought by a third party
against the reimbursed party. See Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1108.
212. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1108.
213. See EPA Lender Rule, supra note 4, at 18,368.
214. See Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1108. The Chevron doctrine provides that if con-
gressional intent on the statutory interpretation at issue is either ambiguous or
absent, a court should defer to an agency's interpretation if that interpretation
is based on a "permissible construction" of the statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
1998] 169
27
170 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
authority regarding liability issues is to bring the issue to
federal court as a prosecutor. 215
F. EPA's 1995 Enforcement Policy Statement
EPA and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) re-
sponded to the Kelley decision by issuing a policy statement
on September 22, 1995, which stated that EPA and DOJ
would apply, as an enforcement guidance policy for CERCLA
actions, the provisions of the vacated EPA Lender Rule
against lenders and government entities that acquire prop-
erty involuntarily (1995 Enforcement Policy).216 EPA did not
raise the validity of the EPA Lender Rule as an enforcement
policy in Kelley v. EPA, and the court there left open this op-
tion for EPA to pursue. 21 7 The 1995 Enforcement Policy in-
structed EPA and DOJ personnel, when exercising their
enforcement discretion, to consult the regulatory text and
preamble language contained in the vacated EPA Lender
Rule so as to endorse the "interpretations and rationales"
contained in that Rule. 218 The 1995 Enforcement Policy was
limited for use by EPA and DOJ employees and was intended
neither to represent a rulemaking nor to create any substan-
tive or procedural rights in any person. 219
In December 1995, EPA issued a fact sheet, for use by
EPA employees, that summarized the 1995 Enforcement Pol-
icy and provided answers to common questions regarding the
effect of the policy on government entities that involuntarily
215. See Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1108-09.
216. CERCLA Enforcement Against Lenders and Government Entities that
Acquire Property Involuntarily, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,517 (1995) [hereinafter En-
forcement Policy]. Examples provided in the EPA Lender Rule of involuntary
property acquisitions by the government include acquisitions by or transfers to
a government entity: (i) "pursuant to seizure or forfeiture authority," (ii) "pur-
suant to abandonment proceedings, or as the result of tax delinquency" or other
instances when a government entity involuntarily "obtains ownership or control
of property by virtue of its function as a sovereign." See EPA Lender Rule,
supra note 4, at 18,385.
217. See Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1109.
218. See Enforcement Policy, supra note 216 at 63,517-18. As in the EPA
Lender Rule, the guidance policy was limited to CERCLA applications and did
not apply to liability issues under RCRA. See id. at 63,518.
219. See id. at 63,519.
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acquire contaminated property.220 On August 20, 1996, EPA
issued a similar fact sheet regarding the effect of the SIE on
lenders (EPA Lender Fact Sheet).221 In this latter fact sheet,
EPA stated that: i) the 1995 Enforcement Policy was issued
as part of EPA's Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initia-
tive, ii) the 1995 Enforcement Policy did not apply to cleanup
enforcement actions initiated by state authorities, and iii) a
lender who leases or re-leases property subsequent to foreclo-
sure would likely not be protected by the SIE unless that
lender held title to the property in a lease financing arrange-
ment prior to foreclosure. 222
G. Case Law After Kelley Decision
The Kelley decision restored the uncertainty created by
the Fleet Factors dicta.223 Subsequent cases, however, tended
to expressly or implicitly follow the principles of the vacated
EPA Lender Rule.
In Z & Z Leasing, Inc. v. Graying Reel, Inc.,224 a federal
district court in Michigan explicitly rejected the Fleet Factors
test because it would "largely eviscerate the exemption Con-
gress intended to afford secured creditors," although the
court declined to establish a bright line test for CERCLA op-
erator liability. 225 The court granted Comerica Bank's
(Comerica) motion for summary judgment on grounds that
the SIE protected it from CERCLA liability.226
Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit (Detroit Bank)
held a security interest in Z & Z Leasing, Inc.'s (Z & Z) per-
220. See U.S. EPA, Fact Sheet: The Effect of Superfund on Involuntary Ac-
quisitions of Contaminated Property by Government Entities (last modified Feb-
ruary 13, 1998) <httpJ/es.epa.gov/oecaosre/951200.html>.
221. See U.S. EPA, Fact Sheet on the Effect of Superfund on Lenders that
Hold Security Interests in Contaminated Property (last modified February 13,
1998) <httpJ/es.epa.gov/oeca/osre960820.html>.
222. See id.
223. See generally, Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1100; see also Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at
1557.
224. 873 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
225. Id. at 55.
226. See id. at 56.
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sonal and real property. 227 Plaintiff Z & Z claimed that
Comerica, as successor to Detroit Bank, was liable as an oper-
ator because it: i) obtained covenants requiring Z & Z to com-
ply with all applicable environmental laws, ii) obtained
negative covenants regarding financial matters of Z & Z, iii)
conducted an environmental investigation of the property six
years after obtaining the first mortgage during which it sam-
pled hazardous substances contained within an abandoned
UST, and iv) reported a release of hazardous substances from
the UST to the State of Michigan.228 The court rejected Z &
Z's claims and held that Comerica was not an operator under
CERCLA because the actions that it took (e.g., requiring com-
pliance with laws, investigating the property for contamina-
tion) were "prudent and routine steps" to protect its security
interest.229
In Kemp Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp.,230 a fed-
eral district court in New Jersey held that Prudential Insur-
ance Company (Prudential), which financed the development
of a property through a sale and leaseback mechanism, was
not liable as an owner or operator even though it held title to
the property as lessor for fourteen years.231 As in Bergsoe
Metal Corporation,232 the court looked to the underlying rea-
son as to why Prudential held title to the property and not
merely the fact that it did SO. 23 3 Prudential financed the con-
struction of a phosphor production operation by purchasing
the facility and immediately leasing the property back to the
operator.234 After considering various factors, 235 the court
227. See id. at 52. Comerica was successor to Manufacturers National Bank
of Detroit. See id.
228. See id. at 54-55.
229. 873 F. Supp. at 55. The court also rejected Z & Z's claim that Comerica
was an owner because Comerica never foreclosed on the real property, and
Michigan followed the lien theory of mortgage law where title does not pass
automatically to the mortgagee upon the granting of a mortgage. See id. at 54.
230. 857 F. Supp. 373 (D.N.J. 1994).
231. See Kemp Indus., 873 F. Supp. at 379, 383, 395.
232. 910 F.2d at 668 (9'" Cir. 1990).
233. See Kemp Indus., 873 F. Supp. at 390.
234. See id. at 378-79.
235. Consistent with New Jersey case law, factors considered by the court to
indicate that a lease is in the form of a security arrangement included whether:
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found that Prudential acquired title to the property as part of
a security agreement to finance the development of the site
and the lessee retained the benefits and risks typically associ-
ated with property ownership. 236
III. Lender Liability Act
On September 30, 1996, the President signed an omnibus
appropriations bill which included the Asset Conservation,
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of
1996 (Lender Liability Act) which amended section 101(20)
and section 107 of CERCLA to clarify the scope of the SIE.237
i) the lessee was required to maintain insurance against casualty loss, ii) the
lessee was required to be fully responsible for casualty loss without any relief
from the lease payment obligations, iii) the lessee was required to indemnify
the lessor from all claims related to use of the equipment, iv) the lessee was
required to pay all taxes related to the equipment, v) the lessee was required to
pay a "substantial deposit" upon acceptance of the lease, vi) the contract in-
cluded an accelerated rent provision in the event of default, and vii) the equip-
ment was purchased by the lessor for the lessee as evidenced by a contract
provision identifying the equipment supplier. See id. at 388-389.
236. See Kemp Indus., 873 F. Supp. at 394. The court noted that the "totality
of the facts surrounding the transaction" is determinative, rather than the "ful-
fillment of a list of elements." Id. As such, the court discounted the marginal
ownership benefits retained by Prudential (e.g., right to depreciate the prop-
erty; absence of a repurchase option in the contract). See id. at 393-94.
The plaintiffs claim that Prudential was an operator because it partici-
pated in the management of the facility was rejected by the court because no
supporting evidence was submitted. See id. at 395. In fact, long-time employ-
ees at the manufacturing plant testified that they never saw a Prudential em-
ployee at the site or knew of any connection between Prudential and the
facility. Id.
237. See Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) [hereinafter Lender Liability Act].
The Act also amends section 107 of CERCLA to limit fiduciary liability to
the value of assets held in the fiduciary capacity. See Lender Liability Act. It
also provides a safe harbor for certain fiduciary actions such as undertaking a
response action under the NCP, terminating the fiduciary relationship, moni-
toring or inspecting the property, and placing environmental covenants or war-
ranties within the fiduciary agreement. See id. These protections are lost,
however, if the fiduciary's negligence causes or contributes to the release of haz-
ardous substances. See id.
Unlike the EPA Lender Rule which only addressed CERCLA actions, the
Lender Liability Act amended RCRA's security interest exemption for owners
and operators of USTs containing petroleum to i) validate an EPA Rule promul-
gated in 1995, codified in 40 C.F.R. § 280.200, regarding the petroleum UST
security interest exemption (EPA UST Lender Rule), and ii) apply the amended
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The Act was the first substantive change to CERCLA in a
decade since the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986.238 The constitutionality of substantive legis-
lation in an appropriations bill has been upheld.23 9
The Lender Liability Act rejects the Fleet Factors dicta
by defining impermissible participation in management as
actual involvement with the management or operation of the
facility, and not "merely having the capacity to influence, or
the unexercised right to control" facility operations. 240 While
the borrower remains in possession of the facility, a security
interest holder will be deemed to have impermissibly partici-
pated in management only when the holder: i) exercises deci-
sionmaking control over the environmental compliance
matters of the facility to the extent that the security holder
has assumed responsibility for hazardous substance manage-
ment, or ii) exercises control similar to that of a facility
manager over a) "day-to-day" environmental compliance deci-
sionmaking, or b) "all or substantially all of the [facility's] op-
erational functions (as distinguished from financial or
administrative functions)" other than those related to envi-
ronmental compliance. 241
Other actions by a security interest holder that would
not be considered participation in management include: i)
acting prior to the time a security interest is obtained (e.g.,
conducting an environmental investigation of the prop-
erty),242 ii) holding, abandoning or releasing of a security in-
terest,243 and iii) providing "financial or other advice" to
remedy or prevent "diminution in the value of the ... facil-
CERCLA SIE provisions to RCRA UST liability issues to the extent there is not
a conflict with the EPA UST Lender Rule. See id. § 2503 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 6691(b)(h)(9)); cf. EPA Lender Rule, supra note 4.
238. Superfumd Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9075 (1986)).
239. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992).
240. See Lender Liability Act, supra note 237, § 2502(b) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(i)).
241. Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(ii)).
242. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(iii)).
243. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(iv)(I)).
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ity."244 Finally, neither the restructuring nor otherwise al-
tering of contractual terms and conditions of the security
agreement, 245 nor the "exercising [of] other remedies" under
applicable law for a breach of the security agreement would
rise to the level of impermissible participation in
management. 246
Regarding the environmental matters of the facility, per-
missible actions by a lender that do not constitute participa-
tion in management include: i) "response actions under
[CERCLA] section 107(d) or under the direction of an [NCP]
on-scene coordinator,"247 ii) inclusion of environmental com-
pliance terms or conditions (e.g., covenants, warranties) in
the security agreement and monitoring or enforcing such
terms or conditions,248 and iii) requiring a "response action or
other lawful means of addressing the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance."249
Provided that a lender acted within the SIE prior to fore-
closure, a lender may continue to receive such protection
notwithstanding the fact that the lender forecloses on the
property, and then continues the business operations, sells or
liquidates the business, or re-leases the property where a
lease finance transaction is involved.250 In addition, after
foreclosure, a lender may perform a section 107(d)(1) re-
sponse action or a response action as directed by an on-scene
NCP coordinator; or, "take[] any other measure to preserve,
protect or prepare" the facility for sale or disposition.251 This
protection is qualified on the lender seeking to sell or re-lease
the facility at the "earliest practicable, commercially reason-
244. Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(iv)(VI)).
245. See Lender Liability Act, supra note 237, § 2502(b) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(iv)(VII)).
246. See Lender Liability Act, supra note 237, § 2502(b) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(iv)(VIII)).
247. Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(iv)(IX)).
248. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(iv)(II-III)).
249. Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(iv)(V)).
250. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)(ii)(II)).
251. Id. § 2502(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)(ii)(II)).
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able time, on commercially reasonable terms taking into ac-
count market conditions."252
The Lender Liability Act provides definitions of "security
interest,"253 and "foreclosure." 25 4 The Act similarly provides
a broad definition of lender that includes private lenders, in-
sured depository institutions and credit unions, and entities
such as the Federal National Mortgage Association. 255
Finally, the Lender Liability Act expressly restores the
portion of the EPA Lender Rule that expanded the list of
state or local government entities that involuntarily acquire
ownership or control of property and that are exempt from
the term owner or operator under section 9601(20)(D). 256
Such examples provided in the EPA Lender Rule include ac-
quisitions by a government agency or agent (i) acting as a
conservator or receiver, (ii) administering a governmental
loan program, and (iii) acting through its seizure or forfeiture
authority.257 The Lender Liability Act declared that this re-
instated portion of the EPA Lender Rule was not subject to
judicial review. 258
252. Lender Liability Act, supra note 237, § 2502(b).
253. The term security interest means "a right under a mortgage, deed of
trust, assignment, judgment lien, pledge, security agreement, factoring agree-
ment, or lease and any other right accruing to a person to secure the repayment
of money, the performance of a duty, or any other obligation by a nonaffiliated
person." Id. § 2502(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(G)(vi)).
254. "Foreclosure" includes, inter alia, acquiring a facility through a deed in
lieu of foreclosure, the termination of a lease agreement, the purchase at a judi-
cial or nonjudicial foreclosure sale, or "any other formal or informal manner by
which the person acquires, for subsequent disposition, title to or possession of a
... facility" to protect that person's security interest. Id. (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(G)(iii)).
255. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(G)(iv)).
256. See id. at § 2504. This exclusion for government entities involuntarily
acquiring property is not available if those entities have "caused or contributed
to the release or threatened release" of hazardous substances. CERCLA
§ 101(20)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
257. See EPA Lender Rule, supra note 4, at 18,385. This exclusion for gov-
ernment entities involuntarily acquiring property exists provided that those en-
tities have not "caused or contributed to the release or threatened release" of
hazardous substances. See id.
258. See Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 2504(b).
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IV. Developments Subsequent to Lender Liability Act
A. Case Law
In Kelley v. Tiscornia,259 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Manu-
facturers National Bank of Detroit (Detroit Bank) on the
grounds that the Detroit Bank did not participate in the man-
agement of the borrower Auto Specialties Manufacturing
Company (AUSCO), as that term was defined by the Lender
Liability Act. 26 0 The court reasoned that there was no evi-
dence that Detroit Bank had participated in the operation of
the facility rather than merely in the financial and adminis-
trative aspects of the business.261 Although the lower court's
January 1993 holding was based on the EPA Lender Rule,
the Sixth Circuit found that the Lender Liability Act essen-
tially codified the EPA Lender Rule, and that the Act gov-
erned disputes that had not been finally adjudicated at the
time of enactment.262
The State of Michigan claimed that Detroit Bank was lia-
ble for on-site contamination as a CERCLA owner or operator
during either of two time periods: (i) when Detroit Bank rep-
resentatives served on AUSCO's board of directors, and (ii)
when a turnaround specialist, recommended by Detroit Bank
as a condition to continued financing, was hired by AUSCO to
manage the business.263 During the first time period, the
lower court found that Detroit Bank acted within the SIE
during its twenty-two year participation on AUSCO's board
and close monitoring of AUSCO's performance because its ac-
tions were limited to AUSCO's financial aspects (e.g. pension
and capital spending issues, borrowing issues with another
lender, financial impacts of labor disputes) rather than actual
control over day-to-day operational (e.g., environmental com-
pliance) matters.264
259. No. 94-1403, 1996 WL 732323, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1996).
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See Kelley v. Tiscornia, 810 F. Supp. 901, 905 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
264. See id. at 906-07.
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Regarding the second time period in question, Detroit
Bank acted within the scope of the safe harbor provision by
avoiding actual control of AUSCO's decisionmaking. 265 The
court found that: i) AUSCO was free to ignore Detroit Bank's
condition that the workout specialist be hired which only evi-
denced permissible influence (even if substantial) but not ac-
tual control by Detroit Bank, and ii) regular communication
between the workout specialist and Detroit Bank was consis-
tent with the Detroit Bank's valid monitoring of AUSCO's fi-
nancial matters and such communication was within the
limits set by the loan agreement.266 Moreover, the lower
court opined that agreeing with the State's argument would
likely result in a denial of further funding to debtors who
owned contaminated property since CERCLA risks would at-
tach to lenders. 267
In F.P. Woll & Co. v. Fifth and Mitchell Street Corp.,268
the plaintiff alleged that Philadelphia National Bank (PNB)
was a former CERCLA operator of a dry cleaning compound
manufacturing facility because it actively managed that facil-
ity during the time hazardous substances were released, in-
cluding the period after PNB foreclosed on the assets of that
facility until it "promptly" resold those assets to a third party.
PNB moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim on
grounds that it was protected from liability under the SIE, as
amended by the Lender Liability Act. 269 The court declined
to grant PNB's motion because of the plaintiffs allegation
that PNB operated the facility when hazardous substance re-
leases occurred. 270
In Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Nationsbank, N.A., 271 a
testator created a trust, with a bank appointed as co-trustee,
to continue the operations of an agricultural chemical com-
pany. Canadyne-Georgia Corporation, a subsequent property
265. See id. at 907-08.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 909.
268. No. CIV.A. 96-5973, 1997 WL 535936 at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1997).
269. See id. at *1.
270. See id. at *2.
271. 982 F. Supp. 886 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
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owner, claimed that the bank was liable under CERCLA sec-
tion 107 as a former owner or operator at the time when haz-
ardous substances were released. 272 The court granted the
bank's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on
grounds that: i) the bank was not a covered person under
CERCLA because, even though the bank held title to the real
property as a tenant in common in the trust, Georgia trust
law imposed liability only on the trust res for tort wrongs
committed by an executor "empowered and directed by the
will to conduct and continue the business of the testator,"273
and ii) the alleged facts were insufficient to state a claim that
the bank was an operator under CERCLA. 274 As the bank
was not a covered person under CERCLA, the court did not
address the bank's second defense that it was protected by
the SIE as amended by the Lender Liability Act.275
In United States v. Pesses,276 a magistrate for a federal
district court in Pennsylvania granted Dollar Savings Associ-
ation's (Dollar Savings) motion for summary judgment be-
cause Dollar Savings qualified for the SIE as that exemption
was defined by the Lender Liability Act.277 Following an auc-
tion of inventory and equipment arranged by a Chapter 7
bankruptcy trustee after the borrower defaulted on loan pay-
ments, Dollar Savings took control of the facility for nearly
three years before returning control to the trustee.278 Dollar
Savings' actions during this period included retaining secur-
272. See id. at 887.
273. Id. at 889 (quoting Fife v. Richardson, 77 Ga. App. 698, 699, 495
S.E.2d. 772, 773 (1948)).
274. See id. at 891.
275. See id. at 888.
276. Civ. A. No. 90-0654, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7902, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 6,
1998).
277. See id. at * 62.
278. See Civ. A. No. 90-654, 1996 WL 143,875, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 1996).
The borrower, Marvin Pesses, operated a scrap processing facility under a fif-
teen-year lease arrangement with the local industrial development authority
who retained title to the property. Civ. A. No. 90-0654, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7902, at *64-65. Under this arrangement, Dollar Savings issued loan proceeds
to the facility by way of the development authority and in return received rental
payments from the facility and obtained a security interest in the personal and
real property. See id. at *65.
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ity personnel, leasing a portion of the site for storage of sail-
boats, communicating with the state environmental agency
and a consulting firm regarding an environmental investiga-
tion at the site, and contracting with a person who success-
fully located buyers for equipment and scrap material
remaining at the site.279 Dollar Savings never foreclosed on
the real estate.280 Dollar Savings was unsuccessful in finding
a buyer to purchase its security interest partly because esti-
mated cleanup costs exceeded the value of the property, and
as a result, Dollar Savings mailed the facility's keys to the
bankruptcy trustee.28 ' The court, in granting Dollar Savings'
motion for summary judgment, found that Dollar Savings
satisfied the SIE because: i) it was undisputed that Dollar
Savings did not participate in the management of the facility
during the period the borrower operated the site as a metal
processing facility, and ii) Dollar Savings made "commer-
cially reasonable efforts, as soon as practicable" to sell the
property. 28 2
B. Revised EPA Enforcement Policy
In 1997, EPA revised its 1995 Enforcement Policy to ac-
count for the enactment of the Lender Liability Act regarding
government entities and lenders that acquire property invol-
untarily (1997 Enforcement Policy).28 3 EPA noted that be-
cause of the substantial similarities between the Lender
Liability Act and the EPA Lender Rule, EPA would use the
EPA Lender Rule's preamble as guidance when interpreting
provisions of the SIE. 28 4 For example, EPA will assess
whether a lender has divested itself of a property after fore-
closure at the "earliest practicable, commercially reasonable
time" and on "commercially reasonable terms" by referring to
279. See id. at *3-4.
280. See id. at *3.
281. See Pesses, Civ. A. No. 90-0654, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7902, at *69-70.
282. Id. at *62, 65-66.
283. Policy on Interpreting CERCLA Provisions Addressing Lenders and In-
voluntary Acquisitions by Government Entities, 62 Fed. Reg. 36,424 (1997).
284. See id. EPA stated that its 1997 Enforcement Policy was intended
"solely as guidance" for EPA employees. See id.
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/16
LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
the preamble language in EPA Lender Rule regarding how a
lender may establish that it has divested itself of a foreclosed
property "in a reasonably expeditious manner."285 Regarding
involuntary acquisitions by government entities, EPA noted
that the Lender Liability Act validated those provisions of the
EPA Lender Rule and, as such, EPA would look to the corre-
sponding preamble language as "authoritative guidance"
when interpreting provisions of the SIE on this issue. 28 6 For
example, EPA will refer to the preamble's definition of "invol-
untary acquisition or transfer" to interpret that term.28 7
V. Analysis of Lender Liability Act
The Lender Liability Act 28 8 clarifies the parameters of
the SIE. The Act is generally favorable to secured creditors
and fiduciaries, as it rejects and puts to an end the Fleet Fac-
tors28 9 "capacity to control" test, and restores the notion that
secured creditors must actually "participate in the manage-
ment" of a facility before incurring liability.
The Act, however, does not offer absolute protection. As
such, incentives continue to exist for lenders to evaluate the
condition of property contemplated as collateral security, and
to carefully assess the nature and extent of any pre- and post-
foreclosure actions, as described below.
A. Lender Liability Act Represents Correct Public Policy
Choice
To the extent that the Lender Liability Act protects se-
cured creditors from CERCLA liability for contamination that
they neither contributed to nor caused, the Act reflects the
correct public policy choice. Providing resolution to the amor-
phous boundaries of permissible SIE actions removes the dis-
incentive for lenders to avoid financing "dirty" businesses,
and removes the disincentive for lenders to walk away from a
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. Id.
288. See Lender Liability Act, supra note 237 and accompanying text.
289. See Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1550.
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property rather than foreclose on a contaminated site and
risk potential liability.
For example, contrary to what the Eleventh Circuit
opined in Fleet Factors, one result of that decision was a di-
version of financing away from businesses that were per-
ceived as presenting an excessive risk of cleanup liability
because their operations involve large quantities of hazard-
ous substances. Regardless of whether the site proved clean
at the inception of the loan, there could be no guarantee that
the site would remain clean in the future when foreclosure
may be contemplated. The potential liability, under the Fleet
Factors dicta, could easily exceed the relatively low loan
value often provided to these businesses. Small and mid-
sized businesses, which are often undercapitalized and incur
relatively greater difficulty and costs in obtaining capital,
were particularly affected. These businesses include such es-
tablishments as dry cleaners, automobile repair shops, gaso-
line stations and other businesses which handle significant
quantities of hazardous substances.
Potential CERCLA liability creates an incentive for lend-
ers to undertake comprehensive environmental inspections of
properties prior to the inception of the loan. An unreasonable
risk of incurring cleanup liability, however, will create an in-
centive for a lender to decline providing a loan to a prospec-
tive borrower if significant contamination is found.
Similarly, with businesses perceived as "dirty," unreasonable
risks of cleanup liability may cause the lender to reject any
financing at the outset without conducting an environmental
site assessment of the property because of the likelihood that
significant contamination exists or may exist in the future.
Moreover, the fear of incurring unlimited environmental
liability provides an incentive for a lender to avoid foreclosing
or otherwise taking control of the property, effectively aban-
doning its interest in the site. As such, a financially dis-
tressed borrower may be unable to obtain needed financing to
continue operations, and ultimately may be forced to close the
facility. The result would be an increase in the number of
abandoned hazardous waste sites in the country, a situation
that CERCLA was intended to correct.
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Redevelopment of brownfields and decreased develop-
ment of greenfield locations will also be facilitated to the ex-
tent that the Lender Liability Act restores certainty about
which acts by lenders will result in liability. Lender liability
is but one of many barriers to redevelopment of brownfields.
This mix of environmental and non-environmental obstacles
makes it likely that lenders will continue to be concerned
about providing financing on brownfields. Additional meas-
ures offered by government regulators, such as covenants not
to sue, will complement the limited incentive offered by the
Lender Liability Act.
Protection afforded lenders in the Act helps to refocus lia-
bility, consistent with CERCLA's goal that the "polluter pays"
for cleanup, on those parties who have actual and meaningful
involvement with site operations or ownership. Otherwise,
lenders can expect to receive claims for recovery of response
costs merely because they may be the only party with some
connection to the site who has deep pockets to pay for the
cleanup. If lenders do become actively involved with facility
operations, then the protection of the SIE will be lost and
they will incur liability under section 107(a)(1) and (a)(2) as
would other owners or operators.
The Lender Liability Act properly confirms that lease fi-
nancing transactions can qualify as protected security inter-
ests under the SIE. Where lenders take title to property as
passive finance lessors and, inter alia, do not retain other in-
dices of property ownership, they should receive the same
limited protection as other secured creditors. Similarly, the
Lender Liability Act, like the EPA Lender Rule, properly rec-
ognizes that indicia of ownership to protect a security interest
includes lenders who hold title to property after foreclosure.
B. Secured Creditors Must Still Be Wary About Potential
Environmental Statutory Liability
Incentives remain for lenders to be concerned about fore-
closing on contaminated property or accepting it as collateral
security. Lenders will not only need to ensure that their ac-
tivities fall within the scope of protection provided by the
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SIE, but also be concerned about potential liability under
other federal statutory provisions. Moreover, unless states
modify their own Superfund programs to offer similar protec-
tion as the federal Lender Liability Act, secured creditors will
face potentially greater and more uncertain liability at the
state level.
Pre-loan activities by lenders are well-defined, limited,
and clearly protected by the Lender Liability Act which pro-
vides that participation in management does not include act-
ing or failing to act prior to obtaining a security interest.
Typical pre-loan activities include conducting environmental
inspections, requiring compliance or cleanup measures in re-
sponse to those inspections, and obtaining contractual provi-
sions (e.g., representations, warranties, covenants) in the
security agreement.
Although protection offered by the SIE is not contingent
on the lender conducting an environmental site assessment
or investigation of the property, a lender nonetheless has a
regulatory incentive to conduct such an inspection in an effort
to qualify for CERCLA's innocent landowner defense. While
the innocent landowner defense is limited and rarely success-
ful, undertaking "all appropriate inquiry" through "commer-
cial or customary practice" at a minimum includes conducting
a site investigation. Neither the courts nor EPA have estab-
lished how extensive and comprehensive an investigation
must be to qualify as "all appropriate inquiry."
During the period when a loan is performing, the Lender
Liability Act provides numerous examples of what participa-
tion in management does not include. Most notably, partici-
pation in management does not include the capacity to
influence or the unexercised right to control facility opera-
tions. Other actions not rising to the level of participation in
management include: i) inspecting the facility, ii) providing
financial advice, iii) restructuring the agreement, iv) and con-
ducting an environmental response action under section
107(d) or under the direction of an on-scene NCP coordinator.
Cleanup actions taken outside these constraints will not be
protected from liability.
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The Lender Liability Act, however, provides less clarity
as to what actions will be considered participation in manage-
ment. The extent to which a lender "exercises decisionmak-
ing control" over environmental compliance matters, or
assumes responsibility over substantially all of the facility's
operational functions, is not clear. The risks of acting outside
the protection of the SIE are even greater for lenders during
"workout" type activities where more involvement with the
troubled borrower occurs than during the period when the
loan is performing. The boundaries of permissible actions in
these circumstances will be clarified through case law.
Moreover, creditors face even more uncertainty about
what post-foreclosure actions constitute "participation in
management." A secured creditor will only receive the pro-
tection of the SIE if it avoided participation in management
prior to foreclosure, and after foreclosure it must divest the
property at the "earliest practicable, commercially reasonable
time" given market conditions. Although the EPA Rule cre-
ated a presumption of twelve months after foreclosure for
when a lender was acting in a reasonable expeditious manner
to divest a property, the Lender Liability Act includes no such
presumption. Not including a fixed time limit provides the
regulated community with needed flexibility and allows for
fact-specific circumstances to dictate what is reasonable di-
vestiture period for a particular property. Yet the downside
of flexibility is less clarity as to when the holding of title will
be deemed to be for investment purposes rather than merely
for protecting a security interest.
After foreclosure, secured creditors who operate the busi-
ness will be exposed to potential environmental liability even
if they remain within the SIE. The Lender Liability Act of-
fers limited protection against owner and operator liability
under CERCLA and Subtitle I of RCRA. Lenders will still
face exposure under other provisions of federal and state law.
For example, a lender operating a business after foreclosure
will be liable for ongoing compliance with existing or future
operating permits and for hazardous substance releases from
waste management units. Secured creditors transporting
hazardous substances off-site for treatment or disposal will
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incur exposure to CERCLA liability as arrangers or
transporters.
The Lender Liability Act offers protection to a lender
that forecloses on a property, but that protection does not ex-
tend to a subsequent purchaser of the property. Extending
such protection to subsequent purchasers would overly
broaden the SIE to parties who did not originally have a se-
curity interest in the property. The lack of such protection
may hinder transfer of contaminated properties and affect
the ability to sell the property within a commercially reason-
able period. A prospective purchaser of contaminated prop-
erty will typically expect to pay a price discounted for the
presence of contamination, and/or receive contractual protec-
tion from the seller for any liability resulting from that con-
tamination. The contractual protection would include an
indemnification from the seller for future claims related to
on-site contamination; the willingness of the buyer to rely on
such an indemnification will rest in part on the creditworthi-
ness of the seller. Transferring an environmentally impaired
property may be problematic unless the lender is willing to
offer such contractual protection and/or to discount the
purchase price, neither of which are attractive options for the
seller.
C. Secured Creditors Also Have Non-Regulatory
Incentives to be Aware of Environmental Matters
Non-regulatory incentives exist for secured creditors to
evaluate the environmental condition of properties being con-
sidered as collateral security. A typical appraisal of the mar-
ket value of a property does not take into account the effect of
contamination on property value, unless that contamination
is obvious and well known. For example, friable asbestos-
containing building materials may be present throughout an
older structure. The cost to abate or remove the asbestos, if
necessary, may be greater than the apparent market value of
the property received from an appraisal that did not inspect
for or otherwise take notice of the asbestos. A latent defect in
the property, which is more likely to go unnoticed during a
market appraisal, is ground-water contamination. When en-
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vironmental site conditions are properly assessed by a lender
prior to financing, a more accurate picture of property and
collateral value emerges, resulting in more informed and pre-
dictable lending decisions.
If contamination is well-defined and manageable (e.g., a
small area of soil contamination), the lender may require that
the borrower conduct a cleanup as a condition to receiving
funding. Occasionally, however, the contamination is wide-
spread, significant, and difficult if not impossible to remedi-
ate in a timely manner (e.g., ground water contaminated with
dense non-aqueous phase liquids such as chlorinated sol-
vents). In these instances, the net collateral value of the
property may be negative, and the lender may decline to lend
on the property regardless of the potential for the lender to
incur cleanup liability.
Environmental investigations also allow for a determina-
tion whether environmental costs may negatively affect the
ability of the borrower to meet loan payments. For example,
the borrower's ability to repay the loan may be affected by
new regulatory requirements that may become effective and
require a significant capital outlay (e.g., for pollution control
technology) to maintain compliance. In the worst case, the
new regulatory requirements may raise operational costs to a
prohibitive level, resulting in a shut-down of the facility.
Similarly, an investigation may reveal existing compliance
deficiencies that require significant capital outlays to resolve,
or the presence of an imminent regulatory order to remediate
contamination on the subject property. Assessing these mat-
ters prior to the inception of the loan provides non-regulatory
benefits to lenders in addition to the evaluation of the poten-
tial for incurring CERCLA liability.
VI. Conclusion
The Lender Liability Act provides important protection
for lenders by clarifying the scope of the SIE and removing
the uncertainty created by judicial decisions such as Fleet
Factors. Questions remain regarding the scope of the SIE,
especially with respect to what actions represent participa-
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tion in management. Future case law will further define the
boundaries of permissible actions. Nonetheless, lenders will
continue to have incentives, as standard commercial practice,
to evaluate the condition of potential borrower's properties
considered for collateral security and to re-evaluate such con-
ditions prior to undertaking a foreclosure action. A lender
will follow these measures regardless of SIE considerations
because of the potential impact on the borrower's cash flow
and on the collateral value of the property.
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